Abstract: With the emergence of the cloud computing paradigm in scientific and business applications, computation outsourcing to the cloud has become a popular application in the age of cloud computing. However, this computing paradigm brings in some new security concerns and challenges, such as input/output privacy and result verifiability. In this paper we use similar transformation of matrix to design secure verifiable and practical outsourcing protocol for matrix multiplication calculation. Compared with those existing outsourcing protocols, our protocol has obvious improvement concerning both efficiency and security. In order to check the correctness of the result returned from the cloud, an efficient verification algorithm is employed. Computational complexity analysis shows that our protocol is highly efficient.
Introduction
Matrix calculation plays an important role in both scientific computation and cryptography. Atallah et al. (2002) first presented a framework for secure outsourcing of scientific computations such as matrix multiplications. Atallah et al. (2005) investigated the problem of computing the edit distance between two sequences and presented an efficient protocol to securely outsource sequence comparisons to two servers. Atallah et al. (2008) addressed the problem of secure outsourcing for widely applicable linear algebra computations. Atallah et al. (2010) gave improved protocols for the secure and private outsourcing of linear algebra computations that enable a client to securely outsource algebraic computations to a remote server. Mohassel et al. (2011) designed noninteractive and secure protocols for delegating matrix multiplication, based on a number of encryption schemes with limited homomorphic properties where the client only needs to perform O(n 2 ) work. Wang et al. (2011) investigated secure outsourcing of widely applicable linear programming (LP) computations. Xu et al. (2013) introduced Outsourcing protocols for convex optimisation. Lei et al. (2014) designed a protocol for outsourcing of matrix multiplication computation to a malicious cloud. designed outsourcing protocol for quadratic programming problem. Zhou et al. (2016) designed two protocols for outsourcing Eigen-decomposition and singular value decomposition of large-scale matrix to a malicious cloud.
Matrix multiplication computation (MMC) is a basic computational problem in scientific and engineering fields and has a number of applications. The matrix multiplication calculation is very necessary for many potential customers, so outsourcing matrix calculation to the ability of the cloud is a very economical method when the local limited computing resources cannot calculate large-scale matrix multiplication. However, although it is quite promising, outsourcing computational problem to the commercial public inevitably brings in new security concerns and challenges. The first challenge is the client's input/output data privacy . The second challenge is the verification of the result returned by the cloud (Shahzad et al., 2014) . The third challenge is efficiency . Thus, it is necessary to design a protocol to ensure the outsourced computation secure, verifiable and efficient. Motivated by this, we develop a secure outsourcing protocol for MMC in this paper. We regard our main goals as follows:
 Correctness: The cloud server can return a correct calculation result to the client, if the client and the cloud run according to the matrix multiplication computation protocol.
 Input-output privacy: The protocol can protect the privacy of the input and the output. Cloud server can't get the original calculation matrix from encrypted matrix. And cloud server can't get the matrix multiplication computation result of original matrix from the calculation result of encrypted matrixes.
 Verifiability: During performing the matrix multiplication computation, the customer can verify the correctness of the output of the cloud server with the maximum probability and also can verify the incorrect output of the cloud server with the maximum probability.
 Efficiency: In the outsourcing computation, the local computation done by the customer should be substantially less than solving the original matrix multiplication computation on its own. Here the computation burden is measured in terms of both time cost and memory requirements.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we present some mathematical background. In Section 3, we introduce the system model and provide the detailed techniques of our outsourcing protocol for LU-decomposition of matrix. In Section 4, we give the related analysis on outsourcing protocol for LU-decomposition of matrix. In Section 5, some existing problems according to the research status and suggestions for the future research direction are proposed. Finally, some concluding remarks are given in Section 6.
Theoretical basis

Mathematical background
Permutation is about the act of rearranging all the elements of a set into another order. The replacement function is widely studied in group theory and combinatorial theory (Cameron, 1994) . Using Cauchy's two-line representation, a permutation function can be expressed as:
Here, we use a permutation function ( 
It is said A is similar with B , recorded Ã B . Similarity transformation theorem:
System model
Cloud server typically runs in semi-trusted or malicious model . However, Outsourcing computing task often contains sensitive information that should not be exposed to the cloud server. Thus, it is required to outsource the matrix in its encrypted form. Due to the lack of incentives in economic returns, the cloud server may return an error result to the client in the outsourcing computation, while hoping not to be detected by the client. So it is also required that the outsourcing protocol for a malicious cloud model should be able to handle result verification. In this paper, we assume that the cloud is malicious, and the communication between the cloud and the customer is reliable. We consider the system model for secure outsourcing of MMC of a matrix involving two different entities, as illustrated in Figure 1 . One entity is the customer, who lacks of computational resources to calculate MMC of matrixes. The other entity is the cloud, which has enhanced computing power. The customer expects to maintain the privacy of the data because the cloud is potentially malicious to the customer. To preserve the privacy, the original matrix X and matrix Y are encrypted into encrypted matrixes X  and Y  with secret key K. And then the customer sends the encrypted matrixes to the cloud. The cloud receives the encryption matrixes and takes them as the input to perform the calculation task, and then returns the result to the customer. After receiving the result of encrypted matrixes, the customer verifies whether the result returned is correct or not. If the computed result is correct, the customer decrypts the output into the desired answer of the original matrixes. Otherwise, the customer returns "wrong" to the cloud and requires it to compute it again. 
Outsourcing protocol of MMC
There are five modules in the system model for secure outsourcing of MMC: encryption, key generation, computing of matrix, verification and decryption. In this section, we introduce a secure verifiable outsourcing protocol for MMC.
Secret key generation
. In this module, resourceconstrained client wants to securely outsource MMC to the cloud. The protocol starts by invoking procedure secret-keygeneration to set up a secret key. We summarise the steps of algorithm for key K as follows: Algorithm 1. Procedure secret-key-generation
Step 1. Input a security parameter  ;
Step 2. The client chooses a set of random number
Step 3.The client invokes random permutation generation algorithm to generate a random permutations:
Here, the random permutation generation algorithm used in algorithm 1 is called Fisher-Yates shuffle (Donald, 2006) . The reason for this algorithm to be used for random permutation generation in this work is that it has already been optimised.
Encryption
In this module, the customer uses matrix similarity transformation theorem to transform the original matrixes into encrypted matrixes as follows:
Algorithm 2. Encryption
Step 1. Input the original MMC problem and the secret key
Step 2. The client generates matrixes P , where ( , ) ( ),
Step 3. The client generates matrixes
Step 4. The client will outsource the encrypted MMC problem to the cloud.
Since the cloud does not have the exact value of invertible matrix P , the customer sends matrixes , X Y   to the cloud the privacy of matrixes , X Y is preserved.
Outsourcing calculation
In this module, the cloud computes multiplication of matrix , X Y   to get the product Z  as follows:
Algorithm 3. Outsourcing calculation
Step 1. Input the encrypted MMC problem, the cloud then invokes any matrix multiplication algorithm to
Step 2. The cloud then sends matrix Z  back to the client.
The privacy of output is preserved, when the cloud sends the result Z  to the client, because the cloud does not have the value of the invertible matrix P .
Decryption
As the relationship between matrixes , X Y and matrixes , X Y   is showed by equation (4), the customer can easily get the product of matrix X Y as follows:
Algorithm 4. Decryption
Step 1. Input: Z  and the secret key K ;
Step 2. The client computes
Now, the customer gets the result of the original matrix XY.
Verification
After decryption of algorithm 4, the client verifies whether the result is correct or not. In this module, to resist the cheating behaviour of the cloud, we summarise the steps of algorithm for the MMC verification as follows:
Algorithm 5 Verification
Step 1. Randomly choosing two number i and j , where
Step 2. Selecting the row 1 2 ( , , )
Step 3. Selecting the column Here, the client accepts the result if it passes through the verification. Otherwise the client declares that the result is wrong and requires the cloud to compute again.
The completed protocol
In this module, cloud outsourcing computing security protocol of MMC based on similarity transformation as follows:
Algorithm 6. The completed protocol
Step 1. The client invokes algorithm 1 to get a secret key
Step 2. The client invokes algorithm 2 to encrypt  into an encrypted MMC   to protect input privacy；
Step 3. The cloud invokes algorithm 3 to get a result Z  of   and returns Z  to the client;
Step 4. The client invokes algorithm 4 to get the unchecked result Z of the original MMC problem  ;
Step 5. The client invokes algorithm 5 to check its correctness.
The agreement contains five parts: secret key generation, encryption, outsourcing calculation, decryption and verification
Analysis of outsourcing protocol of MMC
In this section, we show that our proposed outsourcing protocol of MMC is correct, secure, verifiable and efficient.
Correctness analysis
Theorem 1: The proposed protocol of MMC is correct.
Poof: According to similarity transformation theorem, if both the client and the cloud follow the protocol honestly the correctness of the protocol is obvious. It suffices to show that the result Z X Y     returned by the honest cloud server will be decrypted successfully and the corresponding result Z XY  is always correct. Observe that X  is given by 
Security analysis
Input privacy
The proposed protocol can protect input privacy if the original matrix X is encrypted into matrix X  and the original matrix Y is encrypted into matrix Y  . As we can see from algorithm 1, the original matrix X and matrix Y are encrypted by the following two phases:
Phase 1: The client generates matrix P , where
Phase 2: The transformation of reordering elements
In phase 1, the client generated the invertible matrix P . Further consider that the key space consist of all random permutation of  , meaning that there are ! n cases of permutations. In phase 2, the outsourcing protocol did not leak original matrixes X and Y . The attacker wants to restore matrixes ( , X Y ) from matrixes ( , X Y  ) it must be correct guess out of the two replacement in 2 ( !) n kinds of random permutations and to find the use of 2n random numbers. Thus the expecting times of brute-force attack to recover the matrix , X Y are 2 ( !) n . It is definitely a nonpolynomially bounded quantity. Accordingly, the proposed protocol is believed to reach an applicable secure level in practice. Hence input privacy is protected.
Output privacy
The proposed protocol can protect output privacy if given the returned result Z X Y     , the cloud cannot recover the correct result Z XY  to the original MMC problem. The relationship between the MMC of matrix Z and the MMC of matrix Z  are showed by equation
. Without knowing the invertible matrix P , the cloud can't get the MMC of matrixes XY .
Based on the above analyses, we draw a conclusion that our proposed protocol protects both the input privacy and the output privacy.
Verification analysis
Theorem 2: The proposed protocol satisfies robust cheating resistance.
Proof: The correctness of the decrypted result is checked from step 1 to step 5 in algorithm 5. We prove that any correct result returned from the cloud can pass through the verification successfully. If the cloud behaves faithfully, any correct result can pass through the verification. Let W denote event: "The attacker faked the results and successfully deceived the client". Since the verification value c is secret and Table 1 ), the proposed protocol satisfies robust cheating resistance.
Table 1
The probability of W 1. The cloud server successfully guesses the probability of the matrix P is 1 1 ( )( ) ! n n q ;
2. The probability of guess verification value is 1 q ;
3. The probability of guess position of the verification is 2 1 n ;
4. The probability can accurately find the number m, which accord with
Efficiency analysis
Theorem 3: The proposed protocol of MMC is efficient.
Proof: In the system model of MMC, there are four operations performed by the customer, including key generation, encryption, verification and decryption. To better prove the efficiency of our proposed protocol, we analyse the computational complexity of these four operations individually. First of all, we focus on the key generation operation which is introduced in algorithm 1. The overall task is to generate the key matrix P whose computational complexity is O( ) n . Secondly, we analyse the computational complexity of the encryption operation. It is obvious that it only takes time 2 O( ) n when algorithm 2 transforms the original matrixes into matrixes. Thirdly, the computational complexity of decryption can be analysed in the same way with that of encryption. Therefore, the overall computational complexity of decryption is 2 O( ) n . Lastly, we perform the analysis on verification operation, the overall computational complexity of verification is 2 O( ) n . All in all, the overall computational overhead to the customer is 2 O( ) n . In contrast, it always costs more than 3 O( ) n time to MMC of matrix directly. Thus, the customer can enjoy a great save of computational resources to outsource the MMC task.
Experiment
In this section we assess the efficiency of the proposed outsourcing protocol with numerical experiments. The implementation is done using Matlab2010a on a workstation equipped with Intel (R) Core (TM) 1.8 GHz CPU and 4 GB RAM.
We do not consider the communication latency between the customer and the cloud because the computation occupies the most running. The performance of our outsourcing protocol of MMC is shown in Table 2 . The time that the customer needs to run the algorithm of MMC in our experiment is defined as t origin . The total time spent by the customer when outsourcing is chosen is defined as t client . We refer to t origin /t customer as client speedup. This value theoretically should be a considerable positive number greater than 1, which means there is a considerable performance gain. When the correctness verification value l = 10, the effectiveness of the cloud outsourcing calculation security protocol for large matrix multiplication is shown in Table 2 . When the correctness verification value l = 20, the effectiveness of the cloud outsourcing calculation security protocol for large matrix multiplication is shown in Table 3 . When the correctness verification value l = 30, the effectiveness of the cloud outsourcing calculation security protocol for large matrix multiplication is shown in Table 4 . From the table we can see that the matrix multiplication computation after outsourcing client's calculation does not rapidly increases with the increase of matrix dimensions. This is a good feasibility and economy of the outsourcing protocol of MMC. In the protocol, the client computing gain is always greater than 1, which means that the client selecting the outsourcing calculation can save computing resources. The main performance is shown in Figure 2 . It can be observed that the client computing gain decreases monotonically with the increase in the correctness verification parameter. This is because in the case of proper priority, the client needs to run more random checks, resulting in more computational overhead. 
Conclusion
Cloud computing is capable of providing massive computing resources to clients as services while hiding implementation details from clients. In retrospect, we have designed a protocol for outsourcing matrix multiplication computation to a malicious cloud. We have shown that the proposed protocol simultaneously fulfilled the goals of correctness, privacy (input/output privacy), verifiability and efficiency. We also introduced a verification algorithm. Its superiority in designing inexpensive result verification algorithm for secure outsourcing is well demonstrated. Since matrix multiplication computation of matrix is widely applied in scientific and engineering fields, the proposed protocol can not only be used individually, but also be used as building blocks to some more sophisticated problems. The safety of outsourcing calculation directly affects the promotion and application of new technology. Therefore, it is of great theoretical significance and practical value to study the cloud computing security model and protocol.
